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National Intelligence Daily

Saturday 25 February 1984

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
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IRAN-IRAQ: Fighting Continues	
Iraqi lines are still intact east of Al Basrah, and both sides are resuming attacks against each other's cities.	25X1
the Iragis stopped the Iranian	25X1.1
assaults east of Al Basrah and that Iranian forces there are under	25X1
heavy artillery bombardment.	25X1
US journalists have confirmed that Al Qurnah	25 X 1
is still in Iraqi hands. Iran claims its forces captured some oil facilities	25 X 1
in the swamps east of the main road in the Majnoon area.	25 X 1
	25/1
The Iraqis bombarded Khorramabad and Borujerd with surface-	
to-surface missiles yesterday, and the Iranians retaliated with artillery and air attacks on Al Basrah, Al 'Amarah, and Rawanduz.	25 X 1
,	25X1
Comment: The Iraqis should be able to clear the Iranians out of positions near the main road north of Al Basrah, largely because the Iranians have to move supplies across about 25 kilometers of marsh and swamp. Iraq's air superiority will allow it to use its helicopter	25V4
gunships to disrupt Iranian resupply efforts.	25 X 1

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PLO-JORDAN: Preparing for Arafat's Visit	
PLO chief Arafat may meet with Jordan's King Hussein soon, but they are likely to make little progress in developing a joint approach to future peace negotiations with Israel.	25 X 1
Arafat chaired a meeting of the Fatah Central Committee earlier this week to prepare for discussions with Hussein, and two of his senior advisers arrived in Amman on Thursday. Press accounts state the committee decided that Arafat could try to improve relations with Jordan but that it cautioned he had no mandate to discuss Jordanian representation of Palestinian interests.	25 X 1
The Jordanians have told the US Embassy that Arafat has to be accompanied by members of the PLO decisionmaking bodies. Amman is seeking to prevent Arafat from insisting that he has to refer decisions back to his organization.	25X1
In addition, the Jordanians have lined up a group of pro- Jordanian West Bank Palestinians to be present during Arafat's visit. Amman wants the West Bankers to encourage Arafat to come to terms with Hussein.	25X1
l Duca	25X1 25X1
Arafat Palestinians reportedly also may organize demonstrations in support of the PLO leader. Recent disturbances at a West Bank university were caused in part by clashes between Arafat loyalists and by supporters of the PLO rebels who oppose negotiations with Hussein.	25X1
Comment: Hussein does not expect Arafat to commit himself—during the first round of discussions—to a joint Jordanian-Palestinian arrangement that would lead to negotiations with Israel. Nevertheless, he wants to press Arafat more toward negotiations. The King will point to Palestinian participation in Jordan's parliament and to the presence of West Bank leaders in Amman as strong evidence of the sense of urgency felt by many Palestinians.	25X1
Arafat and his Fatah supporters are not yet committed to cooperating with Hussein. Moreover, they are reluctant to take any decisive steps for fear that a closer alliance with Hussein would cause	

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
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additional defections from the Arafat camp and could lead to a formal

split of the PLO.







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USSR: New Air Restrictions in Berlin	
The USSR has announced new altitude restrictions on Allied flights in the air corridors linking Berlin to West Germany during scheduled military flights through those corridors.	25X1
The Soviet chief controller in the Berlin Air Safety Center informed his Western counterparts on Monday that Soviet corridor reservations would henceforth extend from the inner-German border to the boundary of the Berlin air traffic control zone. During these	
reservations, the Soviets would not guarantee the safety of Allied aircraft flying below 4,500 feet at any point along the corridor. The Soviet action was said to be in response to Allied protests about Warsaw Pact military aircraft in the corridors.	25 X 1
Soviet officials did not respond for several days to Allied protests against the first reservation on Monday. When the US Minister in	

against the first reservation on Monday. When the U Berlin informally protested the second reservation that was announced yesterday, a Soviet Embassy official said that Soviet military authorities had determined that the higher ceiling was needed to ensure the safety of Soviet military flight activity in the area just outside the air traffic control zone. A formal statement delivered later to Allied controllers at the Air Safety Center reaffirmed the second reservation.

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Comment: In the past Soviet reservations applied only to the middle segment of each of the three corridors and did not affect Allied aircraft in their normal descent into, or ascent from, Tegel Airport in Berlin. Allied aircraft now have to fly at an abnormally high altitude as they enter or leave Berlin whenever the new Soviet reservations are in effect, forcing planes using certain runways to circle within the air traffic control zone to attain the proper altitude. This complicates air traffic control procedures and could endanger aircraft in the zone.

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Soviet restrictions on the Berlin air corridors were not a problem until the summer of 1980, when the Soviets ceased simply "closing" specific areas to air traffic and began to coordinate the use of airspace with the Allies at the Air Safety Center. This change of policy apparently was made out of a heightened concern for flight safety that may have stemmed from the Soviets' increasing use of close air support for ground army maneuvers. The apparent confusion of the Soviet Embassy official who received the initial Allied demarche on Monday suggests that Soviet military authorities had decided upon the new restrictions without consulting the Embassy.

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
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NETHERLANDS-US: Foreign Minister's Visit	
Dutch Foreign Minister van den Broek will convey The Hague's growing concern about INF prospects in the Netherlands during his visit to Washington, which begins on Tuesday.	25X1
Comment: The Foreign Minister is a strong advocate of INF deployments, but he and Prime Minister Lubbers may have been too optimistic about the prospects of parliamentary approval. Lubbers has committed his government to a decision by June, and he probably will make a parliamentary vote on INF basing—for which there is currently no assurance of a majority—a matter of confidence. This policy has set the stage for a possible setback that might bring down the government and adversely affect INF commitments in other countries.	25X1
Both Lubbers and van den Broek are aware the Allies would prefer that the Dutch continue to delay rather than risk a negative vote. Several prominent members of van den Broek's Christian Democratic Appeal party—which is the dominant party in parliament—have already called for a postponement of the decision beyond June.	25 X 1
Such a move, however, would delay basing preparations. Defense Minister de Ruiter has pledged to defer construction until a decision to deploy is made.	25X1
To induce a more favorable parliamentary consideration of the issue, the government reportedly has devised a plan that calls for the elimination of at least four of the Netherlands' six nuclear tasks. Even if the Allies agreed to allow the Dutch to eliminate all four tasks, however, there is no quarantee that INF would win parliamentary approval.	25X1
INF will be the most important subject on van den Broek's agenda, but he probably will raise several other bilateral issues. The Hague is uneasy about what it considers the extraterritorial application of US laws—particularly on future Dutch aircraft sales to Libya—and the potential adverse effects on Dutch multinational corporations of the taxing practices of some US jurisdictions. Van den Broek also will underline the necessity for government-to-government offsets in European purchases of US defense systems, such as those The Hague obtained when it recently bought the Patriot missile system.	25 X 1



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GRENADA: Political Maneuvering	
Election preparations are under way, but no broad-based moderate coalition has emerged to oppose the rightist party of former Prime Minister Gairy.	25X1
The Governor General has stated publicly that elections will be neld this year, and the electoral commission says voter registration will begin in mid-March. According to the US Embassy, however, the commission lacks the technical and financial assistance to conduct	
he enumeration efficiently or to mount an information campaign.	25X1
attempts to merge two political parties—one conservative and the other moderate—to compete against Gairy's group thus far have been unsuccessful. Nonetheless, eaders of the two parties have told Embassy officials that they are	25X1
optimistic that a middle-of-the-road group will emerge in the near uture.	25X1
Gairy has announced that he will not run in the elections, but he is openly trying to revive his party and is assisting in the selection of a candidate. To increase his limited public appeal, Gairy is suggesting hat he has US support.	25X1
The New Jewel Movement, which was resurrected last month under the cover of the Maurice Bishop Memorial Fund, is conducting a variety of fundraising activities. According to the Embassy, many Grenadians doubt the movement will put forth a candidate in the elections. If it does, however, they believe he will be defeated.	25X1
Comment: Most Grenadians have shown little interest in elections so far and appear confused by the sudden proliferation of	20/(
collitical parties. A low voter turnout is likely unless an information campaign is mounted to motivate citizens to register and vote. Such a urnout might favor Gairy, because he is well known. The failure of the	
moderates to unite into a single coalition also would help the chances	25X1

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AUSTRIA-US: President's Visit

President Rudolf Kirchschlaeger's largely ceremonial visit to the US is intended to emphasize the generally good bilateral relations, but he also may want to discuss East-West, Middle Eastern, and Central American issues.	25X1
Kirchschlaeger arrives in New York tomorrow to begin a nine-day visit. The US Embassy in Vienna reports that the Austrians believe the trip reflects the close relations between the two nations. It also is intended to balance the President's visit to Moscow in 1982, in keeping with Austria's policy of neutrality.	25X1
Comment: There currently are almost no strains in bilateral relations. Technology transfers to the USSR and Eastern Europe, as well as US restrictions on the import of specialty steels, had caused difficulties last year. A voluntary arrangement to restrict the reexport of US-origin technology and the Orderly Marketing Agreement on Austrian steel exports have partially resolved these problems.	25X1
In 1983 Vienna launched the "USA Concept," a four-year program commemorating the 35th anniversary of the Marshall Plan, by promoting bilateral ties in a variety of fields. US and Austrian representatives agreed last month to establish a program to encourage scientific and technical cooperation, which the Austrians plan to announce during the visit.	25X1
The Austrians also may want to have broader discussions on foreign policy issues. They believe that, as neutrals, they can play a useful role in world affairs. Austrian assessments of Central America and the Middle East differ from those of the US, but Austria retains a generally pro-Western orientation.	25X1
At the same time, Kirchschlaeger supports Austria's historically close ties with its East European neighbors. Austrians continue to believe detente is a workable policy, and they are likely to offer to help reduce East-West tensions.	25X1

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EL SALVADOR: Election Concerns of the Military

victory	me military leaders are worried that a Christian Democratic in the election on 25 March could threaten the autonomy of the forces.	25 X 1
reform military that a	e US Embassy reports that Defense Minister Vides fears a list government might attempt the wholesale replacement of y leaders. Vides also indicates the armed forces are concerned Christian Democratic administration could lead to a dialogue le insurgents and eventually would facilitate their integration in litary.	25X1
suppor anxiety forces concer	e Embassy says President Magana believes extreme rightists rting presidential candidate D'Aubuisson are fomenting such y in the military. Magana plans to assist the chiefs of the armed in drafting a paper that outlines the military's postelection rns. He also will help to win approval from all political party s for the military's policy position.	25X1
		25X1
Embas been re	espite Vides's calls for neutrality during the campaign, the say reports that at least two important field commanders have eprimanded for trying to intimidate peasants to vote for uisson.	25X1 25X1
military rightist well for military particu	pmment: Vides's fears about potential election difficulties in the y establishment and his concern about the apparent efforts by to political forces to manipulate individual officers probably are unded. He and other pragmatic officers seem to regard the y position paper as a device for preventing major problems, ularly in dealings with Christian Democratic presidential	25X1
Ne inevita	evertheless, efforts by some officers to sway the vote appear ble. Although these attempts are unlikely to have a substantial ton the voting, D'Aubuisson probably will be the main ciary.	25 X 1

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PERSIAN GULF-US: Unease About Policy in Le	banon	
The pullback of the US Marines in Lebanon hamong leaders in Qatar, the United Arab Emirates US cannot be relied upon to protect their security Prince Hamad asked US Embassy officials last would deal with a similar show of force in the Perforeign policy adviser to the President of the UAB Lebanon is a forerunner of disaster for the Persia sees encircled by radical religious and nationalist Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Alawi told a delegation on Sunday that US indecisiveness in Lin a victory for Syria and the USSR.	s, and Oman that the y. Qatar's Crown eek how the US rsian Gulf. The chief E says the fall of an Gulf, which he t forces. Omani US banking	25X1
Comment: Arabs of the Persian Gulf are and developments in Lebanon and US policy there. T support the legitimate government against extremato avoid appearing to side with Christians in a way They have urged the US to stand up to the Syrian appalled by the damage caused by US Navy shell overriding concern is that the US pullback in Leb Iranian aggression.	hey profess to mists, but they want ar with Muslims. ns but say they are llings. Their	25X1
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USSR-VIETNAM-CHINA: Support for Hanoi		
Pravda on Thursday carried a TASS disp	oatch from Hanoi	
recounting Vietnamese press articles on the	history of the Sino-	
Vietnamese border dispute. TASS drew a sh		
Hanoi's "sincere efforts" to improve relation Beijing's demands for recognition of the exist		
by Chinese "aggression" in 1979. The TASS	dispatch also said that	
the Chinese are continuing subversive activi-	ty against Laos and	

Kampuchea and that they are "intimidating the ASEAN countries with the specter of Vietnamese expansionism" in an attempt to "isolate" Hanoi.

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Comment: The article in Pravda is the USSR's first public criticism of China since Andropov's death and marks a shift from the more positive coverage given the talks in Moscow last week between First Deputy Premier Aliyev and his visiting Chinese counterpart. It probably was prompted by heightened concern over Sino-Vietnamese border tensions. The article also may be designed to reassure the Vietnamese that Moscow will protect their interests in the Sino-Soviet talks scheduled for next month.

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


ANGOLA: New Fighting in the East A statement issued by UNITA on Thursday claims that government troops, with the support of Cuban armor and aircraft, have launched an offensive to recapture insurgent-controlled areas in eastern Angola. UNITA cited the offensive as a reason it cannot participate in the Angolan–South African cease-fire. Comment: The offensive could be an attempt to relieve the Angolan forces in Luau that have held out against insurgent attacks since late January. UNITA now has over 3,000 soldiers near Luau, and they probably will put up stiff resistance to any government effort to reclaim lost territory. UNITA leader Savimbi is likely to believe that a strong military showing in the east would underscore UNITA's demand for a role in negotiations with Luanda leading to a regional settlement. 25X1		l op Secret	
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25X1	settlement.		
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SPAIN: Effort To Disrupt Basque Election		
The Basque Socialist senator murdered on Thursday was killed by members of some offshoot of the terrorist of ETA, in order to disrupt the election tomorrow of represe the Basque regional parliament and to strike back at Ma more ruthless tactics against Basque terrorists. Because assassination, campaigning has been halted. All major paincluding Herri Batasuna, the political front for ETA's mill have condemned the act. Two groups have claimed cred the senator.	organization entatives to drid for its of the arties, itary wing,	5 X 1
Comment: Popular revulsion may harm Herri Batasus in the election because it is closely identified with terrorist votes and the support of rightists who want to protest te will strengthen the Socialists' chances of placing a strong to the moderate Basque Nationalist Party. This could del Nationalists of their current working majority in the Basque Parliament. If they are forced to govern in coalition with the right or the left, their ability to cooperate with Madric	m. Sympathy rrorism g second prive the ue either	5 X 1
counterterrorism would be limited.	2	3 X I
SOUTH KOREA: Further Easing of Political Ban Seoul plans to announce today that President Chun ban on 202 of 301 persons prohibited from participating	in politics. A	
South Korean security official says several leading oppose will not have their rights restored.	sition figures 2	5 X 1
Comment: The announcement comes on the first and Chun's initial easing of the ban, and he will point to it as a his commitment to gradual relaxation of controls. The mestrengthen the hand of Chun's ruling party in the parliam elections expected later this year or early in 1985. The leapposition parties already are squabbling over how to at newly released politicians. Major opposition figures prohipolitical activity will be tempted to violate the ban to present the same of the same	n example of ove should nentary egal osorb the ibited from serve their	
position. This could increase the chances for a clash with government this spring.	n the 25	5X1

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WEST GERMANY: Economic Policy Under Attack		
West German economic indicators are almost all p		
government continues to be criticized for not tackling a problems. Business leaders complain of a lack of over		
economic policy, and respected research institutes ac		
government of lacking the will to bring about promised	I changes in the	
structure of the economy that are necessary for mediu	m-term growth.	
Even members of Chancellor Kohl's center-right coalit whether the government can deal effectively with the coality with the c		25X1
underlying economic ills.	ountry 5	23/1
, 5		
Kohl had campaigned on a pledge to restore conf	idence and	
incentive to an overtaxed, overregulated economy tha		
by a financially unsupportable social welfare system. government moved quickly after taking office in Octol		
increasing taxes and cutting social benefits, which rec		25X1
budget deficits substantially.		25/1
Over the past year growth has consistently outstri and each new projection has been more optimistic that		
before. After real GNP growth in 1983 of 1.3 percent,		
for 1984 range from 2.5 to 3 percent, largely on the st	trength of	
expected gains in exports and investment of 5 percent		
Unemployment, West Germany's most intractable eco could ease slightly this year.	nomic problem,	25X1
osala sass siigiiliy liio ysali		
Nevertheless, the government's much-proclaimed		
turnaround has not yet materialized. West German budetect a sense of drift in economic policy as the gove		
follow up on its initial steps.	Timent fails to	25 X 1
Uncertainty in the business community has been	fostered by:	
		05140
		25 X 6
Government vacillation over tax reform an	d over how to	
reorganize the social welfare system.	id over now to	
 Bickering within the coalition. 		
 The impending trial of Economics Minister 	Lambsdorff,	25X1
who is charged with corruption.		20/(1
	continued	
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	Kohl has been buffeted by a succession of problems		
	the economy. The proposed merger of the Thyssen and k		
	companies collapsed in November, after Kohl had commi		
	prestige by intervening to resolve differences delaying the merger was central to government efforts to reorganize to		
	sector, which is being hurt by weak demand and cheap in		
	sector, which is being fluit by weak definant and cheap in	riports.	25X1
_			
	The bankruptcy of West Germany's largest constructi	on company	
	also caused anxiety about the economy to grow. Some b		
	moreover, had to take emergency action to bail out a ma	jor private	25X1
	bank.		
	The appropriate Mastelli contrary Union, the approximate law		
	The aggressive Metalworkers Union, the country's lar with 2.6 million members, announced last October that it		
	mobilizing to secure a 35-hour workweek. Since then, lab		
	demonstrated a new militancy in the face of firm resistan		
	employers. Government officials and businessmen fear the		
	industrial disputes will develop this spring that could thre		25X1
	recovery.		20/(1
	Widespread Criticism		
	West Germany's five major economic research institu	itos	
	acknowledged last fall that the economy was recovering		
	and strongly than they had thought possible. As a result o		
	problems inherent in the structure of the economy, howe		25X1
	expect the recovery to be short lived.		20/(1
	The institutes believe business generally lacks confide		
	growth will be sustained because the government has promedium-term economic strategy. Specifically, Bonn has r		
	changes it led business to expect.	iot made the	25 X 1
	onanges it is a susmoss to exposi.		
	Subsidies to ailing industries, taxation, and bureaucr		
	regulation have increased. According to the institutes, the		051/4
	developments are discouraging investment and initiative.		25X1
	A number of government leaders, or well as real, an	d file	
	A number of government leaders, as well as rank-and members of the parties in the government, reportedly als		
	confidence in the government's policy. They worry that, if		
	were to founder and unemployment to resume its climb,		
	government could be unseated by the Social Democrats		25 X 1
	I ambadorff himself has said the startion will be were	or look on	
	Lambsdorff himself has said the election will be won the issue of the economy. Government support among w		
	the issue of the economy. Government support among w	01 4619 19	
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	25 X 1
particularly vulnerable. They have lost income as a result of austerity measures.	25 X 1
Some Cautious Optimism	
The Council of Economic Experts presented a hopeful analysis in November, asserting 3-percent real growth is attainable this year with exports and investments playing leading roles. It seems determined to counteract the widespread pessimism, which it considers exaggerated. The council believes that such a misreading of the	,
economy has a self-fulfilling, depressing effect on investment.	25 X 1
The council, however, states that it is concerned that not enough s being done to dismantle obstacles to growth. In particular, it cites the need for tax reform and for ending oversubsidization of ailing ndustries.	25X1
For the government, the most welcome aspect of the current economic rebound is the respite in the growth of unemployment. Joblessness is still near record-high levels, with 9 percent of the labor orce out of work.	25X1
Since August, however, joblessness has been inching downward. Forecasters increasingly see unemployment holding steady or declining slightly this year.	25X1
Outlook	
Kohl is not yet in political trouble over the economy. Polls show hat, if an election were held now, the Christian Democrats would do virtually as well as in the election last March.	25X1
The current limited recovery offers an opportunity to establish an economic policy for the medium and longer term. Kohl almost certainly realizes his political future largely depends on his handling of he economy. He reportedly would like to introduce a new economic strategy in May at the congress of the Christian Democratic Party.	25 X 1
The government, however, is unlikely to take decisive action on he economy any time soon. Kohl remains reluctant to intervene in the disputes over the timing of tax reform and other issues or to take a position on the details of any issue. So far, he has not shown the will o override internal dissension and develop a program.	25X 25X
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